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In this paper we outline a framework for the study of the mechanisms involved in
the engagement of human agents with cultural affordances. Our aim is to better
understand how culture and context interact with human biology to shape human
behavior, cognition, and experience. We attempt to integrate several related approaches
in the study of the embodied, cognitive, and affective substrates of sociality and
culture and the sociocultural scaffolding of experience. The integrative framework we
propose bridges cognitive and social sciences to provide (i) an expanded concept
of ‘affordance’ that extends to sociocultural forms of life, and (ii) a multilevel account
of the socioculturally scaffolded forms of affordance learning and the transmission of
affordances in patterned sociocultural practices and regimes of shared attention. This
framework provides an account of how cultural content and normative practices are built
on a foundation of contentless basic mental processes that acquire content through
immersive participation of the agent in social practices that regulate joint attention and
shared intentionality.
Keywords: affordances (ecological psychology), cultural affordances, radical embodied cognition, enactive
cognitive neuroscience, free-energy principle, predictive processing, regimes of attention, cognitive
anthropology
INTRODUCTION
The acquisition of culture is notoriously difficult to study. Over 70 years of research on the
development of person-perception, for example, have made it clear that children as young as
4 years of age have already acquired implicit biases about ethnicity and other socially constructed
categories of persons (Clark and Clark, 1939; Clark, 1963; Hirschfeld, 1996; Machery and Faucher,
2005; Aboud and Amato, 2008; Kelly et al., 2010; Huneman and Machery, 2015; Pauker et al., 2016).
These biases are consistent with the dominant culture of their societies, but are most often not
consciously held or explicitly taught by their caregivers and educators. While most young children
express a positive bias toward people they identify as members of their own group, children from
minority groups typically show preferences for dominant groups, rather than for persons of their
own ethnicity (Clark and Clark, 1939; Kinzler and Spelke, 2011). How such biases are acquired is
still an open question. Ethnographic studies of socialization, education, and language acquisition
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have pointed to broad cross-cultural variations in how children
are instructed, spoken to, expected to behave, involved in
community activities, and exposed to other socializing agents
beyond nuclear or extended families (Mead, 1975; Schieffelin
and Ochs, 1999; Rogoff, 2003). However, by age 5, children
across cultures have for the most part become proficient in
the dominant set of expectations and representations of their
cultures, despite the much discussed poverty of cultural stimuli
to which they are exposed (Chomsky, 1965). These matters point
to a human propensity for ‘picking up’ the broad scripts of culture
even without any explicit instruction. In other words, we all
come to acquire the shared background knowledge, conceptual
frameworks, and dominant values of our culture. The presence
of intuitive or implicit, yet stable and widely shared beliefs and
attitudes among children constitutes a challenging problem for
cognitive and social science.
In this paper, we outline a framework for the study of the
mechanisms that mediate the acquisition of cultural knowledge,
values, and practices in terms of perceptual and behavioral
affordances. Our aim is to better understand how culture and
context shape human behavior and experience by integrating
several related approaches in the study of the embodied,
cognitive, and affective substrates of action and the sociocultural
scaffolding of embodied experience. The integrative framework
we propose bridges cognitive and social sciences to provide (i)
an expanded concept of ‘affordance’ that extends to sociocultural
forms of life, and (ii) a multilevel account of the socioculturally
scaffolded forms of affordance learning and the transmission of
affordances in patterned sociocultural practices.
The context of the present discussion is the search for the
‘natural origins of content’ (Hutto and Satne, 2015). We hope
to contribute to the naturalistic account of the emergence of
semantic content, that is, of the evolution (in phylogeny) and
acquisition (in ontogeny) of representational or propositional
content. Cultural worlds seem to be full of meaningful ‘content’—
of explicit ways to think about and respond to the world in terms
of kinds of agents, actions, and salient events. ‘Content,’ here, is
defined in terms of representational relations with satisfaction
conditions: a vehicle x bears some semantic or representational
content y just in case there are satisfaction conditions which,
when they obtain, tell us that the vehicle is about something.
Semantics is an intensional notion (Millikan, 1984, 2004, 2005;
Haugeland, 1990; Piccinini, 2015). How do humans acquire this
cultural knowledge and capacity to respond in social contexts in
ways that actors and others find meaningful and appropriate?
We hypothesize that agents acquire semantic content through
their immersion in, and dynamic engagement with, feedback
or looping mechanisms that mediate shared intentionality and
shared attention. Semantic content, we suggest, is realized
in culturally shared expectations, which are embodied at
various levels (in brain networks, cultural artifacts, and
constructed environments) and are enacted in ‘regimes’ of shared
attention. We generalize contemporary ecological, affordance-
based models of cognitive systems adapting to their contexts over
ontogeny and phylogeny to account for the acquisition of cultural
meanings and for the elaborate scaffoldings constituted by
constructed, ‘designer’ niches (Hutchins, 2014; Kirchhoff, 2015a;
Clark, 2016). We suggest that ‘regimes of shared attention’—
that is, patterned cultural practices (Roepstorff et al., 2010)
that direct the attention of participant agents—modulate the
acquisition of culturally specific sets of expectations. Recent
work in computational neuroscience on predictive processing
provides a model of how cultural affordances could scaffold the
acquisition of socially shared representational content. In what
follows, we shall sketch a multilevel framework that links neural
computation, embodied experience, cultural affordances, and the
social distribution of representations.
We begin by specifying a conceptual framework for ‘cultural
affordances’, building on recent accounts of the notion of
affordances in ecological, enactivist, and radical embodied
cognitive science (Box 1). We propose to distinguish two kinds
of cultural affordances: ‘natural’ affordances and ‘conventional’
affordances. Natural affordances are possibilities for action, the
engagement with which depends on an organism or agent
exploiting or leveraging reliable correlations in its environment
with its set of abilities. For instance, given a human agent’s
bipedal phenotype and related ability to walk, an unpaved
road affords a trek. Conventional affordances are possibilities
for action, the engagement with which depends on agents’
skillfully leveraging explicit or implicit expectations, norms,
conventions, and cooperative social practices. Engagement with
these affordances requires that agents have the ability to
correctly infer (implicitly or explicitly) the culturally specific
sets of expectations in which they are immersed—expectations
about how to interpret other agents, and the symbolically and
linguistically mediated social world. Thus, a red light affords
stopping not merely because red lights correlate with stopping
behavior, but also because of shared (in this case, mostly
explicit) norms, conventions, and rules. Both kinds of cultural
affordances are relevant to understanding human social niches;
and both natural and conventional affordances may be socially
constructed, albeit in different ways (Hacking, 1999). Human
biology is cultural biology; culture has roots in human biological
capacities. The affordances with which human beings engage are
cultural affordances.
We then assess the tensions between our proposed framework
and radical enactivist and embodied approaches, which
are typically committed to forms of non- (or even anti-)
representationalism. On these views, perception, cognition,
and action need not involve computational or representational
resources. The scope of this claim varies. For some, this
entails a rejection of computational or representational
models and metaphors in the study of the mind—a staunch
commitment to anti-representationalism (Varela et al., 1991;
Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009).
More conciliatory positions instead suggest that basic cognitive
processes are without content, but accommodate a place for
contentful cognition. They claim that certain typically human
forms of cognition involve representations, in the sense that
human agents have the dispositions (mechanisms, behavioral
repertoires, etc.) that are required to immersively engage
with sociocultural content (e.g., patterned symbolic practices,
linguistic constructions, storytelling and narration). We argue
that contemporary computational neuroscience complements
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BOX 1 | Basic concepts of a framework for cultural affordances
Affordance: A relation between a feature or aspect of organisms’ material environment and an ability available in their form of life (Chemero, 2003, 2009; Bruineberg
and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
Landscape of affordances: The total ensemble of available affordances for a population in a given environment. This landscape corresponds to what evolutionary
theorists in biology and anthropology call a ‘niche’ (Rietveld, 2008a,c; Rietveld et al., 2013; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
Field of affordances: Those affordances in the landscape with which the organism, as an autonomous individual agent, dynamically copes and intelligently adapts.
The field refers to those affordances that actually engage the individual organism because they are salient at a given time, as a function of the interests, concerns, and
states of the organism (Rietveld, 2008a,c; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
Cultural affordance: The kind of affordance that humans encounter in the niches that they constitute. There are two kinds of cultural affordances: natural and
conventional affordances.
Natural affordance: Possibilities for action (i.e. affordances), the engagement with which depends on the exploitation or leveraging by an organism of ‘natural
information’, that is, reliable correlations in its environment, using its set of phenotypical and encultured abilities (roughly what Grice meant by ‘natural meaning’)
(Piccinini and Scarantino, 2011; Piccinini, 2015).
Conventional affordance: Possibilities for action, the engagement with which depends on agents’ skillfully leveraging explicit or implicit expectations, norms,
conventions, and cooperative social practices in their ability to correctly infer (implicitly or explicitly) the culturally specific sets of expectations of which they are
immersed. These are expectations about how to interpret other agents, and the symbolically and linguistically mediated social world (Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010;
Tomasello, 2014; Satne, 2015; Scarantino, 2015).
the more conciliatory of these approaches by providing minimal
neural-computational scaffolding for the skilled engagement of
organisms with the available affordances.
Having done this, we turn to affordances in social and
linguistic forms of life. We examine local ontologies, understood
as sets of shared expectations, as well as the complex feedback
relations (or looping effects) between these ontologies and human
modes of communication, shared intentionality, and shared
attention. Drawing on the skilled intentionality framework
(Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014), we examine the dynamics
of cultural affordance acquisition through patterned cultural
practices, notably attentional practices. We hypothesize that
feedback mechanism between patterned regimes of attention
and shared forms of intentionality (notably shared expectations
and immersion in local ontologies) leads to the acquisition of
such affordances. This framework can guide future research on
multilevel, recursive, nested cultural affordances and the social
norms and individual expectations on which they depend.
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
AFFORDANCES
Much recent work in cognitive science has been influenced by
the notion of affordances originally introduced by Gibson (1986).
The interdisciplinary framework currently being developed to
study affordances provides us with a point of departure for
thinking about the evolution and acquisition of semantic,
representational content. The aim of this section is to clarify the
implications of adopting this framework.
Affordances are central to the emerging ‘enactivist’ and
‘radical embodied’ paradigms in cognitive neuroscience.
Theorists of enactive cognition model the intelligent adaptive
behavior of living cognitive systems as the dynamic constitution
of meaning and salience in rolling cycles of perception and
action, explicitly recognizing the emergence of meaning and
salience in the active, embodied engagement of organisms with
their environment (Di Paolo, 2005, 2009; Noë, 2005; Thompson,
2007; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011; Hutto and Myin, 2013; Di Paolo
and Thompson, 2014; Hutto and Satne, 2015; Kirchhoff, 2016).
Embodied approaches in cognitive science explain the feats
of intelligence displayed by cognitive systems by considering
the dependence of cognition on the various aspects of the
body as it engages with its environment, both internal and
external (Barsalou, 2008; Shapiro, 2010). ‘Radical embodied’
cognitive science extends the theoretical framework of ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1986) to the embodied cognition paradigm,
providing a phenomenologically plausible account of active,
dynamical coping (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Chemero, 2003,
2009; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein,
2014). Recently, the enactive, radical enactive, and radical
embodied approaches have been extended to ‘higher-order’
social and cultural systems (Froese and Di Paolo, 2011; Hutto
and Myin, 2013; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). This latter
branch of enactivist theory will concern us especially.
Perspectives, Affordances, and
Phenomenology
One of the distinctive contributions of ecological, radical
embodied, and enactivist theories of cognition is their shared
emphasis on the point of the view of the organism itself,
understood as an intentional center of meaningful behavior.
The implication of these ‘perspectivist’ approaches in cognitive
science is that the world is disclosed as a set of ‘affordances,’ that
is, possibilities for action afforded to organisms by the things
and creatures that populate its environmental niche, as engaged
through their perceptual and sensorimotor abilities (Turvey et al.,
1981; Turvey, 1992; Reed, 1996; Heft, 2001; Silva et al., 2013; cf.
also Varela, 1999; Thompson, 2007). To paraphrase Wittgenstein,
the world is the totality of possibilities of action, not of things.
Perspectivist approaches in cognitive science operationalize this
view of the organism and propose an account of perception,
cognition, and action that is closer to the phenomenology of
everyday experience.
Affordances provide an alternative framework for thinking
about perception, cognition, and action that dissolves the strict
conceptual boundary between these categories in a way that is
closer to the phenomenology of everyday life1. This approach
1Enactive accounts reject the rigid separation of perception, cognition, and action,
emphasizing that organisms cope with their environment in rolling cycles of
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echoes the kernel insights of the phenomenology of Heidegger
(1927/1962) and Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, 1964/1968) about
perception and action. Cognitive agents experience the world
perceptually through the mediation of action, as a function of
those actions that things in the world afford. For example, my cup
of coffee is not first perceived as having such and such properties
(size, shape, color), and only then as providing the opportunity
for sipping dark roast. Instead, my filled cup is directly perceived
as affording the action of sipping. Filled cups of coffee afford
sipping; a paved road affords walking; a red traffic light affords
stopping. The claim, then, is that cognitive agents typically do not
encounter the world that they inhabit as a ‘pre-given,’ objective,
action-neutral set of things and properties, to be reconstructed in
perception and cognition on the basis of sensory information, as
classical models in cognitive science once suggested (e.g., Fodor,
1975; Marr, 1982; Dawson, 2013). The things that we engage are
disclosed instead directly as opportunities for action—that is, as
affordances. As Heidegger (1927/1962) famously argued, it is only
when my smooth coping breaks down (say, when I run out of
coffee, or when the cup breaks) that the objective properties of
the cup become salient, present in perceptual experience at all.
The principal motivation for thinking of perception,
cognition, and action in terms of engagement with affordances
is that cognitive scientific accounts of these activities ought to
be coherent with the phenomenology of action and perception
in everyday life. Phenomenology tells us that there are dense
interrelations between action and perception, that perception is
mainly about the control of action, and that action serves to guide
perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, 1964/1968). Affordances
provide a framework apt for this task, allowing us to integrate
phenomenological experience into our models of explanation in
cognitive science (Varela, 1996; Petitot et al., 1999). As the story
goes, in the wake of the behaviorist turn, experiential factors and
mentalist language were banished from psychology (Watson,
1913; Skinner, 2011). Cognitive science rehabilitated mentalism,
at least to some extent, in its postulation of cognitive states and
processes (Fodor, 1975; Putnam, 1975). Most contemporary
functionalist and mechanistic accounts of cognition, however,
contend that it is possible to exhaustively explain a cognitive
function by specifying its functional organization or the
mechanism that implements that function (e.g., Craver, 2007;
Bechtel, 2008). As we shall see presently, the perspectivist
emphasis on the dynamics of the phenomenology of everyday life
that characterizes enactive and ecological approaches allows us to
account for cognitive functions with a conceptual framework that
engagement in which the distinction between action, cognition, and perception
is blurred. When such a distinction is made, enactivist thinkers typically resist the
traditional picture that subordinates action to perception or cognition. Theorists
who draw the distinction nevertheless emphasize the deep connection between
perception, cognition, and action. There are good reasons to think that action is
a precondition for perception or that perception is a form of action (Clark, 2016;
Kirchhoff, 2016). As we shall see in Section “The Neurodynamics of Affordances,”
free-energy approaches frame perception and action as complementary ways of
minimizing ‘prediction error.’ Our preference is to speak of rolling cycles of
‘action-perception’ to refer to the complex looping process whereby organisms
cope with their environment. These cycles rely on various complementary
computational strategies to minimize prediction error, which may (or may not)
correspond to the traditional concepts of action, cognition, and perception.
explicitly bridges the phenomenology of action and perception,
system dynamics, and functionalist cognitive neuroscience.
Landscapes and Fields
Affordances, as possibilities for action, are fundamentally
interactional. Their existence depends both on the objective
material features of the environment and on the abilities of
different kinds of organisms. This dependence on interaction
does not mean that affordances have no objective reality
or generalizability (Chemero, 2003, 2009). Affordances exist
independently of specific individual organisms. Their existence
is relative to sets of abilities available to certain kinds of
organisms in a given niche. ‘Abilities,’ here, refers to organisms’
or agents’ capabilities to skillfully engage the environment, that
is, to adaptively modulate its patterns of action-perception to
couple adaptively to the environment. Without certain abilities,
correlative opportunities for action are unavailable. Certain
chimpanzees, for instance, are able to use rocks to cracks nuts.
But for nuts and rocks to afford cracking, the chimp must already
be cognitively and physiologically equipped for nut-cracking. In
Chemero’s model of affordances, objectivity and subjectivity do
not have separate ontological status; they co-exist and co-emerge
relationally.
Building on Chemero (2003, 2009) and Rietveld and
Kiverstein (2014) define an affordance as a relation between
a feature or aspect of organisms’ material environment and
ability available in their form of life. ‘Form of life’ is a notion
adapted from the later Wittgenstein (1953). A form of life is
a set of behavioral patterns, relatively robust on socio-cultural
or biographical time scales, which is characteristic of a group
or population. We might say that each species (or subspecies),
adapted as it is to a particular niche and endowed with specific
adapted abilities, constitutes a unique form of life. Different
human communities, societies, and cultures, with sometimes
strikingly different styles of engagement with the material and
social world, constitute different forms of life. There are thus at
least two ways to change the affordances available to an organism:
(i) by changing the material aspects of its environment (which
may vary from small everyday changes in its architecture or
configuration to thoroughgoing niche construction) and (ii) by
altering its form of life or allowing it to learn new abilities already
available in that form of life (interacting in new ways with an
existing niche by acquiring new abilities through various forms
of learning).
Following recent theorizing on affordances (Rietveld, 2008a,c;
Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), we
consider the distinction between the ‘landscape’ of affordances
and the ‘field’ of relevant affordances. The claim is that, typically,
organisms do not engage with one single affordance at a given
time. The world we inhabit is instead disclosed as a matrix
of differentially salient affordances with their own structure or
configuration. The organism encounters the world that it inhabits
as an ensemble of affordances, with which it dynamically copes
and which it evaluates, often implicitly and automatically, for
relevance. For an affordance to have ‘relevance’ here means
that the affordance in question ‘solicits’ the individual, concrete
organism by beckoning certain forms of perceptual-emotional
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appraisal and readiness to act. This occurs because affordances
are both descriptive and prescriptive: descriptive because they
constitute the privileged mode for the perceptual disclosure of
aspects of the environment; and prescriptive because they specify
the kinds of action and perception that are available, situationally
appropriate and, in the case of social niches, expected by others.
The ‘landscape’ of affordances is the total ensemble of
available affordances for a population in a given environment.
This landscape corresponds to what evolutionary theorists in
biology and anthropology call a ‘niche’ (Odling-Smee et al., 2003;
Sterelny, 2007, 2015; Wilson and Clark, 2009; Fuentes, 2014).
A niche is a position in an ecosystem that affords an organism the
resources it needs to survive. At the same time, the niche plays
a role vis-à-vis other organisms and their niches in constituting
the ecosystem as a whole. A typical ecosystem (that is, a physical
environment where organisms can live) has multiple niches,
which have some degree internal structure: affordances have a
variety of dynamics relationships (one thing leads to another,
depends on, reveals, hides, enables, other possibilities for action;
Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016). Thus, the niche is the entire set of
affordances that are available, in a given environment at a given
time, to organisms that take part in a given form of life. More
narrowly, a niche comprises the affordances available to the group
of organisms that occupy a particular place in the ecosystem—
or, in the case of humans, the social world—associated with (and
partly constituted by) a form of life.
The ‘field’ of affordances, on the other hand, relates to
the dynamic coping and intelligent adaptivity of autonomous,
individual organisms. The field refers to those affordances that
actually engage the individual organism at a given time. Of
those affordances available in the landscape, some take on
special relevance as a function of the interests, concerns, and
states of the organism. These relevant affordances constitute the
field of affordances for each organism. They are experienced
as ‘solicitations,’ in that they solicit (further) affective appraisal
and thereby prompt patterns of ‘action readiness,’ that is, act as
perceptual and affective prompts for the organism to act on the
affordance (Frijda, 1986, 2007; De Haan et al., 2013; Rietveld et al.,
2013). This engagement will vary in complexity, conformity, and
creativity from pre-specified or pre-patterned ways of acting to
“free” improvisation, as we shall see below2.
The field of affordances changes through cycles of perception
and action. Changes in the situation that the organism engages
give rise dynamically to different solicitations, as a function of
the state of the organism, much the way a physical gauge field
gives rise to different potentials as a function of the local forces
(Sengupta et al., 2016). Consider the action of drinking a cup of
2Some might express unease at the mixed language we use, which straddles
phenomenology, system dynamics, and cognitive functions. We take this as a
virtue of the multilevel nature of the explanatory framework provided by the
notion of affordances, which is operative at all of these different descriptive levels.
Readers who would prefer to keep phenomenological description distinct from
other explanatory levels (i.e., neural, social, cultural levels of explanation) can
replace our talk of directly modulating the landscape or field of affordances with
a more phenomenologically neutral concept, such as the organism’s ‘selective
openness’ (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). With this terminology, we might say
that changes in the patterns of activity in the organism (states, interests, etc.) and
the environment shape the organism’s selective openness to saliencies.
coffee. The filled cup affords a gradient (grasping, sipping), that
is, a potential for coupled engagement. When generated by the
organism-environment system, this gradient can be experienced
by the organism as a solicitation. The gradient is dissipated
through engagement. The experience of satiation that follows
drinking, combined with the fact that cup has been emptied,
alter the field of affordances, which as indicated changes as a
function of the states of organism and niche. Thus, the gradient
is ‘consumed’ or dissipates after successful engagement.
Meaning and Affordances
Not all affordances are of the same kind. Here we draw on Grice’s
theory of meaning to suggest an approach to the varieties of
cultural affordances in terms of their dependence on content-
involving conventions. We argue that the affordances in human
niches (what we call generally ‘cultural’ affordances) are of two
distinct kinds: ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ affordances.
Grice’s theory of meaning, elaborated in a series of papers
in the philosophy of mind (Grice, 1957, 1969, 1971, 1989), and
later refined by Sperber and Wilson (1986), Levinson (2000), and
Tomasello (2014), is often termed ‘intention-based semantics’, or
‘implicature.’ On a Grician account, meaning lies in a speaker’s
communicative intent; that is, in what she intends to convey
through an utterance. Grice elaborated the first formula of his
theory of meaning in these terms (using the subscript NN to
signify to ‘non-natural’):
“A meantNN something by X” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered
X with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the
recognition of this intention” (Grice, 1989, p. 19)
Taking this model beyond the dyadic sphere of conversational
implicature, Grice later attempted to explain how “timeless” (that
is to say, durable and widely shared) conventions of meaning are
recognized in a shared cultural repertoire:
“x meansNN (timeless) that so-and-so” might at a first shot
be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements
about what “people” (vague) intend (with qualifications about
“recognition”) to effect by x (Grice, 1989, p. 220)
In the subsequent ‘relevance’ account, Sperber and Wilson
(1986) translated this automatic ‘first shot’ recognition of
conventional meaning as one in which human minds scan for
salient, meaning-generating cues in the environment, and stop
processing when the cues are secured.
Our model draws on Grice to describe the stabilization of
cultural cues as affordances. Key to our approach is the implied
ontological and epistemic status of other minds (that is, the
intentions of ‘persons’) in the embodied cognitive work required
in the ‘recognition,’ or more precisely, the enactment of meaning.
Our proposal, then, is to follow Grice in understanding the
thought, affect, and behavior of human agents as determined by
implicit expectations about others’ expectations. Specifically, we
argue that humans behave according to the way they expect others
to expect them to behave in a given situation (see Figure 1)3. As
3This basic cognitive formula for sociality requires three orders of automatic
intentionality; that it is to say, an implicit, non-narrative, hypothesis-generating,
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FIGURE 1 | Basic cognitive formula: three orders of automatic intentionality.
we shall explicate below, we contend that humans operate (often
pre-reflectively) within the landscape and field of possibilities for
variations in action4 as a function of their expectations about
what others expect of them in specific contexts (see Figure 2).
The importance of these revisions to Grice’s model of
meaning to our framework for cultural affordances is to
highlight the dependence of certain kinds of affordances on joint
intentionality, and effective social and cultural normativity and
conventionality, or equivalently, the shared expectations (both
implicit and explicit) that codetermine the affordance landscape
and local field dynamics. Grice (1957) distinguished between
error-reduction scenario of the “I think they think I think” variety that can be
translated as “what would relevant others expect me to think/feel/do in this
situation?”
4The notion of variation and improvisation in action within a convention is very
important. Humans do not simply obey prescribed expectations, but also resist,
transgress and transform them. Specific fields of joint-intentional affordances, thus,
invariably entail different licenses for improvisation on expected behavior. The
background formula for action is not simply “what would others expect me to do
here?” but also “how much license or room to improvise do I have here given what
the set of local cues tells me about others’ expectations and the norms that should
otherwise govern my behavior in this specific situation?”
natural and non-natural forms of meaning, emphasizing the
latter in most of his work. Natural meaning is a relation between
two things that are correlated. Smoke ‘means’ fire because tokens
of smoke reliably correlate with tokens of fire. Similarly, (certain
kinds of) spots mean measles (understood not as the popular
category but as the biomedically recognized infection with a
particular virus). Non-natural meaning instead depends on the
capacity of individual agents to exploit explicit and implicit
social ‘conventions’ (in the wide sense of locally shared norms,
values and moral frames, expectations, ontologies, etc.) to infer
the intentional states of other agents and thereby engage them
or engage aspects of the environment with them. Red traffic
lights, in virtue of convention (and law), ‘mean’ stop, and hence
afford (and mandate) stopping—and this is made possible by the
specifically human mastery of recursive inferences, both explicit
and implicit, that agents make about other agents (Tomasello,
2014).
Recent work on information processing has extended Grice’s
framework to account for different kinds of information
(Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010; Piccinini and Scarantino, 2011;
Piccinini, 2015). A token informational vehicle x of kind X
FIGURE 2 | Full cognitive formula: three orders of intentionality governing improvisational variations in action.
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(that is, a sign, a pattern of neural activation, or what have
you) carries ‘natural information’ about some information
source y of kind Y just in case there are reliable correlations
between X and Y. Natural information, in other words, cannot
misrepresent, for it is non-semantic; it is not the kind of
thing that can be simply true or false. Such information can
be exploited and leveraged by a cognitive system to guide
intelligent behavior. Conversely, ‘non-natural information’ (or
as we prefer to put it, ‘conventional information’), pertains
to semantic, content-involving representations that depend on
social norms and cultural background knowledge. Non-natural
information allows an agent to make a correct inference about
some aspect of an intentional system, e.g., other agents, language
and other symbolic systems such as mathematics, etc. Non-
natural information is semantic in that it obtains in virtue of
satisfaction conditions (e.g., truth conditions). A vehicle carries
this kind of information about some state of affairs just in
case some (explicit or implicit) shared convention, in the sense
outlined above, links a vehicle to what it represents.
In the psychological and anthropological literature,
affordances are usually understood as interactional properties
between organisms and their environment that can be
individually discovered in ontogeny without social learning.
Chimpanzees, for example, rediscover how to crack nuts with
rocks in each generation without vertical social transmission of
skills (Ingold, 2000, 2001; Howes, 2011; Moore, 2013). Most of
what humans do, in contrast, is learned socially and requires
complex forms of coordination. We suggest, however, that
successfully learned human conventions that govern action
are also best conceptualized as affordances. Such affordances
depend on shared sets of expectations, reflected in the ability
to engage immersively in patterned cultural practices, which
reference, depend on, or enact folk ontologies, moralities and
epistemologies. We might call these ‘conventional’ affordances.
An empty street affords being walked on or driven on to
the lone pedestrian or driver. Yet affordances, especially those
depending on conventions, might differ depending on context.
A red traffic light, as we have seen, affords an agent stopping,
particularly in the presence of others, and especially in the
presence (real or imagined) of police who are expecting to
intervene. But a driver might alter her behavior as a result
of not being seen by others. A red traffic light in an empty
street at 4:00 AM, thus, might afford transgression of the
stopping rule following an inference about the absence of other
minds likely to judge the agent. Departing from Grice and
earlier theories of information processing (Dretske, 1995), one
might understand the notion of information as probabilistic:
to carry information implies only the truth of a probabilistic
claim (Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010; Scarantino, 2015).
Although this account was developed for natural information,
we extend it here to conventional information, given the
prominence of social improvisation. ‘Conventions’ need not be
explicitly formulated as rules, and may instead originate in the
actors’ engagement with local backgrounds over time that is,
from non-contentful developmental experiences, learning, or
participation in social and cultural practices (Piccinini, 2015;
Satne, 2015).
A cultural artifact may have multiple affordances according
to its embedding in larger webs of relationships that are part
of the individual’s history of learning and the expectations
for the potential participation of others. Indeed, to operate
with conventional affordances, agents must have shared sets of
expectations—we must know what others expect us to expect.
Simple rule-governed models of sociality go on the
assumption that conventions lead to stable, binary affordances,
where satisfaction conditions are either met or not. However,
cultural symbols and signs are usually polysemous and their
interpretation depends on context. Moreover, variations in the
way agents engage with affordances in practice, often license what
we could term ‘skilled improvisation.’ Rules and conventions
can be followed slavishly, selectively ignored, deliberately
transgressed, or re-interpreted to afford new possibilities. Natural
dispositions for shared intentionality in what Searle (1991,
1992, 1995, 2010) calls the deep background, on this view,
give rise to cooperative action not only through convention
but also through iterative variations governed by modes of




Some aspects of culture clearly involve content in the
improvisational sense of the term: namely, those affordances
that depend on conventions, social normativity, and the ability
to improvise from a joint-intentional background enriched by
cultural learning. Here, we aim to contribute to the effort to
explicate the mechanisms by which basic minds are scaffolded
into more elaborate content-involving processes. To explain
agents’ engagement with contentful affordances requires a theory
of cultural content and representations.
Our hypothesis, to be explicated below, is that feedback loops
mediating shared attention and shared intentionality are the
principal mechanism whereby cultural (especially conventional)
affordances are acquired. Before proceeding, however, we must
face an objection stemming from tensions between our enactivist-
embodied-ecological framework and our aim of providing
a theory for the acquisition of semantic content. We have
suggested that conventional affordances depend on shared
expectations, perspective-taking, and even mindreading abilities.
However, proponents of radical embodiment and enactivism
argue that cognition can be understood as the coupling of an
organism to its niche through dynamical processes, without
any need to invoke representational processes and resources
like explicit expectations and mindreading (Varela et al., 1991;
Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009). On
these accounts, classical theories of cognition (Fodor, 1975;
Marr, 1982), which modeled cognition as the rule-governed
manipulation of internal representations, radically misconstrue
the nature of agents’ intentional engagement with their worlds.
The claim, then, is that much cognition can (indeed, must)
be explained by appealing only to dynamical coupling between
organism and environment.
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Rejecting the claim that cognition necessarily involves
representations, radical enactivists insist that basic cognitive
processes (‘basic minds’) can function entirely without content
(Thompson, 2007; Hutto and Myin, 2013). The argument,
then, is that minds, especially basic minds like those of
simple organisms (and many of the unreflective embodied
engagements of more complex minds), do not require content.
They only require adequate forms of coupling, which need
bear no content at all. Adequate coupling only requires an
organism to leverage correlations that are reliable enough
to be exploited for survival. This poses a challenge to a
theory like ours, which aims to explicate the acquisition
of cultural content in the form of conventional affordances.
In this section, we accommodate this radical minimalism
about representations and semantic content while sketching




Recent work on computation and neurodynamics helps to
clarify the scope of radical arguments against content-involving,
representational theories of cognition. Although older semantic
theories view computation as the processing of representations
(with propositional content and satisfaction conditions) more
recent theories do not make this assumption. The ‘modeling view’
of computation (Grush, 2001; Shagrir, 2006, 2010; Chirimuuta,
2014) suggests that computation in physical systems (calculators,
digital and analog computers, neural networks) employs a
special kind of minimal, structural or analogical model based
on statistical correlations (O’Brien and Opie, 2004, 2009, 2015).
On this view, a computational process is one that dynamically
generates and uses a statistical model of a target domain (say,
things in the visual field). The model is said to ‘represent’
that domain only in the sense that the relations between its
computational vehicles (digits, neural activation patterns, or
what have you) preserve the higher-order statistical, structural-
relational properties of the target domain, which can be leveraged
to guide adaptive action. We might call this ‘weak’ (non-
propositional) content, based on structural analogy between
vehicle and target domain (O’Brien and Opie, 2004, 2009,
2015). Such statistical models are much more minimalistic than
traditional representational theories of mind, which require
that internal representations bear propositional content (Fodor,
1975). Even more minimalistic accounts of computation are
available. Computation can be defined mechanistically, as the
rule-governed manipulation of computational (rather than
representational) vehicles (Milkowski, 2013; Piccinini, 2015).
On the mechanistic account, computations (digital, analog,
neural) can occur without any form of semantic content
(Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010; Piccinini and Scarantino,
2011).
Thus, some of the newest theories of computation are
minimalistic about the representational nature of neural
processes. Whether the modeling-structural and the mechanistic
minimal statistical models deserve the label ‘representation’ is
debatable (Anderson and Chemero, 2013; Piccinini and Shagrir,
2014; Hutto, 2015; Clark, 2016). To some degree the conflict may
be merely terminological. What matters for our purposes is to
note that the minimalistic statistical-computational models in
the cognitive system can be leveraged to guide skilled intelligent,
context-sensitive, adaptive behavior. This provides additional
weight to the claim that basic minds are without strong,
propositional, semantic content (Hutto and Myin, 2013; Hutto
et al., 2014).
While this may be the case, human societies clearly transact
in content-laden representations. We use language replete with
images, metaphors and other symbols to tell stories and narrate
our lives. We imagine particular scenarios or events, and we
think about, describe, elaborate and manipulate these images or
models in ways that treat them as pictures or representations
of possible realities. Importantly, even on the radical view on
offer here, nothing precludes such content-involving cognition.
In recent discussions around the natural origins of content,
it is hypothesized that neural computations can come to
acquire representational content when coupled adequately to
a niche or milieu through dense histories of causal coupling
(Hutto and Myin, 2013; Hutto and Satne, 2015; Kirmayer and
Ramstead, 2016). We suggest that immersive involvement of
agents in patterned cultural practices during development, and
the subsequent practice of the abilities acquired in enculturation,
allows for the acquisition of stable cultural affordances. In the case
of human beings, whose learning is mostly social, the function
of the neural computations performed by a system becomes that
of interfacing adequately with both representational and non-
representational aspects of culture so as to guide appropriate
behavior.
Free-Energy and the Neurodynamics of
Affordances
The framework we think can account for the acquisition
of cultural affordances by agents rests on recent work in
computational neuroscience and theoretical biology on
the ‘free-energy principle.’ The free-energy principle is a
mathematical formulation of the tendency of autonomous
living systems to adaptively resist entropic disintegration
(Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010, 2012a, 2013a,b; Sengupta
et al., 2016). This disintegration can be thought of as the
natural tendency of all organized systems (which are by their
nature far-from-equilibrium systems) to dissipate, that is,
to return to a state of low organization and high entropy
or disorder—in other words, to return to (thermodynamic)
equilibrium. The free-energy principle states that the
dynamics of living organisms are organized to maintain
their existence by minimizing the information-theoretic quantity
‘variational free-energy.’ By minimizing free-energy, the
organism resists entropic dissipation and maintains itself in its
phenotypical steady-state, far from thermodynamic equilibrium
(death).
One application of the free-energy principle in computational
neuroscience is a family of models collectively referred to as
‘hierarchical predictive processing’ models, which instantiate
a more general view of the brain as a ‘prediction machine’
(Frith, 2007; Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Friston, 2010, 2011,
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2012b; Bar, 2011; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; for empirical
evidence, see Adams et al., 2016). In this framework, the
brain is modeled as a complex dynamical system, the main
function of which is to ‘infer’ (in a qualified sense) the
distal causes of its sensory stimulation, starting only from
its own sensory channels. The strategy employed by the
brain, according to this view, is to use a ‘generative model’
of the distal causes and engage in self-prediction (Friston,
2010; Eliasmith, 2005). That is, the system’s function is
to predict the upcoming sensory state and compare it the
actual sensory state, while minimizing the difference between
these two distributions (predictions and prediction errors)
through ongoing modification of predictions or action on the
environment (see Figures 3 and 4).
‘Generative models’ are minimal statistical models, of the kind
discussed above. The use by a system of generative models need
not entail semantic content. Their function is to dynamically
extract and encode information about the distal environment as
sets of probability distributions. The information involved here
can be natural or conventional in kind. The only entailment
is that the system or organism must leverage its generative
model to guide skilled intentional coupling. The system uses this
generative model to guide adaptive and intelligent behavior by
‘inverting’ that model through Bayesian forms of (computational,
subpersonal) inference, allowing it to leverage the probability
distributions encoded in the model to determine the most
probable distal causes of that distribution and to act in the most
contextually appropriate way (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark,
2016).
FIGURE 3 | Hierarchical prediction error minimization frameworks. In
the predictive processing approach, the main activity of the nervous system is
to predict upcoming sensory states and minimize the discrepancy between
prediction and sensory states (‘prediction errors’). The information propagated
upward to higher levels for further processing consists only in these prediction
errors.
FIGURE 4 | A diagram of Bayesian inference in predictive processing
architectures. The dynamics of such systems conform to the principles of
the Bayesian statistical inference framework. The Bayesian statistical
framework is central to predictive processing architectures, for the latter
assume that neural network interactions operate in a way that maximizes
Bayesian model evidence. Bayesian methods allow one to calculate the
probability of an event taking place by combining the ‘prior probability’ of this
event (the probability that such an event takes place before considering any
evidence) with the ‘likelihood’ of that event, that is, the probability of that event
given some evidence. This allows the Bayesian system to calculate the
‘posterior probability’ of the event, that is, the revised probability given any
new available evidence. Prior probabilities are carried by predictions (green
arrows) issued by the generative model units (green units). Likelihoods are
carried by prediction errors (red arrows) issued by the error units (red units). In
the ‘empirical Bayes’ framework, the system can then use the posterior
obtained from one iteration as the prior in the next iteration. Predictions issued
from the generative models, which encode prior beliefs, propagate up, down,
and across the hierarchy (through backwards and lateral connections) and are
leveraged to guide intelligent adaptive action-perception. This leveraging is
achieved by canceling out (or ‘explaining away’) discrepancies, which encode
likelihood, through rolling cycles of action-perception. This same process
allows the system to learn through plastic synaptic connections, which are
continuously updated through free-energy minimization in action-perception.
The system thus continuously and autonomously updates its ‘expectations’
(Bayesian prior beliefs) in rolling cycles of action-perception.
How does this inversion take place? Generative models
are used to generate a prediction about the upcoming
sensory distribution. Between the predicted and actual sensory
distributions, there almost always will be a discrepancy
(‘prediction error’), which ‘tracks’ surprisal (in the sense that,
mathematically, it is an upper bound on that quantity). The
free-energy principle states that all living systems act to reduce
prediction error (and thereby implicitly resist the entropic
tendency toward thermodynamic equilibrium—dissipation and
death). This can occur in one of two complementary ways: (i)
through action, where the best action most efficiently minimizes
free-energy by making the world more like the prediction
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(‘active inference’); and (ii) through perception and learning,
by selecting the ‘hypothesis’ (or prediction, which corresponds
to the probable distal cause of sensory distribution) that most
minimizes error, or changing the hypotheses when none fits
or when one fits better (Friston, 2011, 2013a; Friston et al.,
2012a,b; Friston and Frith, 2015a,b). Given that generative
models embody fine-grained statistical information about the
distal environment at different scales, the top-down prediction
signals (produced by higher levels in the processing system)
provide crucial contextualizing information for the activity
of lower levels in the predictive hierarchy, rendering the
feedforward error signal contextually sensitive and adaptive (see
Figure 5).
The representational minimalism of embodied generative
models nicely complements the representation-sparse
phenomenology of affordances. Such minimal models
might be described as exploiting (non-semantic) information
for affordances, rather than (semantic) information about
affordances (van Dijk et al., 2015); that is, the sensory array only
carries information given certain uses of it by organisms (i.e.,
being a statistical proxy). The ‘internal representations’ involved
here might best be thought of as transiently ‘soft-assembled
neural ensembles,’ adequately coupled to environmental
affordances (Anderson, 2014).
It can be argued that predictive processing models
complement enactivist and radical embodied approaches
and are compatible with minimalism about representations,
provided we do not interpret the statistical computations and
error signal processes in a strong semantic, content-involving
sense (Hutto and Satne, 2015; Kirchhoff, 2015a,b, 2016; Kirmayer
and Ramstead, 2016). Generative models are simply embodied
statistical models that are dynamically leveraged to guide
intelligent adaptive behavior.
Generative models are embodied at different systemic levels
and timescales, in different ways. As indicated, at the level of the
brain, the predictive hierarchical architecture of neural networks
come to encode statistical regularities about the niche, which
allow the organism to engage with the field of affordances in
adaptive cycles of action-perception. But the embodiment of
generative models does not stop at the brain. Indeed, one radical
implication of the free-energy principle is that the organism itself
is a statistical model of its niche (Friston, 2011, 2013b). States
of the organism (i.e., its phenotype, behavioral patterns, and
so forth) come to statistically model the niche that it inhabits
FIGURE 5 | Diagram of hierarchical structure of the predictive processing networks. Predictive networks have hierarchical structure in the sense that their
processing is layered. The layered (hierarchical) structure of the generative model allows the model to capture the nested structure of statistical regularities in the
world. This inferential architecture effectively allows the system to leverage new information dynamically and implement a ‘bootstrapping’ process, whereby the
system extracts its own priors from its dynamic interactions with the environment. Computationally, each individual layer has the function of extracting and
processing information leveraged to cope with regularities at a given level or scale. In this example, information about the visual scene is decomposed into high,
medium, and low spatial frequency bands. Typically, low spatial frequency features change at a faster than high spatial frequency features. As such, lower spatial
frequency information is encoded higher up in the processing hierarchy, to guide lower-level, faster processing of higher spatial frequency information. The
hierarchical or layered statistical structure of the generative model enables it to recapitulate the salient statistical structure of those systems to which it is coupled. As
discussed in the text, this need not imply semantic content (but does not exclude it either).
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over evolutionary timescales (Badcock, 2012). Thus, phylogeny
conforms to the free-energy principle as well, because the effect
of natural selection is to select against organisms that are poor
models of their environments. Those organisms that survive
and thrive are those that embody, in this literal sense, the best
generative models of their niche. Organism phenotypes can
be described as conforming to the free-energy principle over
developmental timescales in morphogenesis as well (Friston et al.,
2015b). Generative models are thus not only ‘embrained,’ but
embodied in an even stronger sense, over the timescales of
phylogeny and ontogeny. This strong embodiment allows one
to interpret free-energy approaches in a non-internalist way and
to counter some objections raised against earlier formulations
of predicting processing approaches (e.g., Hohwy, 2013; Clark,
2016). This multilevel embodiment of the generative model, as
we shall argue below, extends to the concrete, material, human-
designed milieus (or ‘designer environments’) in which humans
operate.
Some generative models (in this wide sense) involve semantic
content and others do not (they involve something more minimal
than satisfaction conditions, i.e., reliable covariation). The study
of minds without content is compatible with more extensively
content involving forms of (social and cultural) cognition that
are scaffolded on such basic minds through processes of social
learning and enculturation.
On the radical enactivist account, content-involving forms
of intentionality emerge in the context of certain cultural
practices in human forms of life (Hutto and Satne, 2015).
Many of these practices involve multi-agent situations in which
proper engagement requires forms of implicit perspective-taking
and perspective-sharing (Sterelny, 2015). In some cases, such
practices can involve explicit ‘mindreading’ as well, that is,
inferring the beliefs, intentions, and desires of other agents as
such (Michael et al., 2014). There is a long-running debate
among anthropologists over the extent to which inferences
about other people’s mental states (as opposed to, say, bodily
states) may reflect a folk psychology that is more pronounced
among modern Western peoples (Robbins and Rumsey, 2008;
Rumsey, 2013). This ‘transparency of mind’ folk psychology is
contrasted in the literature with so-called ‘opacity doctrines’
found in other cultures, in which people’s interior states are
said to be ‘opaque,’ or unknowable. As recent multi-systems
account of social cognition have shown, however, situations
involving novel cues or too many orders of intentionality will
often trigger ‘higher’ cognitive resources and compel humans
to think about other people’s intentions as such (Michael et al.,
2014). Engagement with affordances in the human niche also
often requires ‘mindshaping,’ as our interpretation of other
agents’ intentional profiles in turn shapes those same profiles
through interpersonal loops (Sterelny, 2007, 2015; Zawidzki,
2013). Perspective-taking can be implicit and embodied in
that organisms can act on situations by leveraging minimal
models that encode information about other agents and their
behavior without entailing the presence of semantic content (i.e.,
having satisfaction conditions). But this is not incompatible with
the claim that perspective-taking and mindshaping abilities, in
the human niche, often involve symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of communication, which substantially change
the kind of affordance landscape available to human agents
(Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2013, 2015).
Although the perspectivist focus on the dynamic embodied
enactment of meaning in a shared social world is central to
our understanding of cultural affordances (Gallagher, 2001,
2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009), our contention is that
the acquisition of representational content in ‘epidemics’ of
socially shared representations (Sperber, 1996; Claidière et al.,
2014) entails that cognitive agents must be endowed with a
neural-computational scaffolding adequate to such activities5.
Even though basic cognition (and indeed, some forms of
‘higher’ cognition; Hutto and Myin, 2013) may be without
content, given the symbolic and linguistic nature of human
experience and culture, the human cognitive system must
be equipped with the neural-computational resources needed
to adequately couple with shared social representations, if
we are to account for how the latter are transmitted stably
and reliably. Semantic content is acquired through dense
histories of embodied engagement with the environment. For
humans, this involves participation in patterned, linguistically
and symbolically mediated practices—which include patterns of
shared attention and shared intentionality.
Predictive Processing and Attention
One aspect of the architecture of predictive processing is crucial
for our account of cultural affordances: the predictive processing
model specifies a deep functional role for attention. Attention,
on the predictive processing account, is modeled as ‘precision-
weighting,’ that is, the selective sampling of high precision
sensory data, i.e., prediction error with a high signal-to-noise
ratio (Feldman and Friston, 2010). The efforts of the cognitive
system to minimize free-energy operate not only on first-order,
correlational statistical information about the distal environment,
but on second-order statistical information about the signal-
to-noise ratio or ‘precision’ (that is, inverse variance) of the
prediction error signal as well. This allows the system to give
greater weight to less noisy signals that may provide more reliable
information. Based on this information, the cognitive system
balances the gain (or ‘volume’) on the units carrying prediction
errors at specific levels of the hierarchy, as a function of
precision. This control function, in effect, controls the influence
of encoded prior beliefs on action-perception (Friston, 2010).
Greater precision means less uncertainty; the system thus ‘ups
the volume’ on high precision error signals to leverage that
information to guide behavior. Attention, then, is the process
whereby synaptic gain is optimized to ‘represent’ (in the sense
of reliably co-varying with) the precision of prediction error in
hierarchical inference (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Clark, 2016).
Precision-weighting is centrally important in these
architectures and has been proposed as a mechanism of neural
5We should note a few limitations of the ‘epidemic’ metaphor: (i) representations
are not merely transmitted through contagion, but through many different means,
modes of communication, and practices that are themselves culturally mediated;
(ii) they reside not just in individuals, but also in artifacts and institutions; and
(iii) they are usually not simply replicated, but modified or transformed by each
individual or institution that takes them up.
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gating. Gating is the process whereby effective connectivity in
the brain (Friston, 1995, 2011), that is, the causal influence of
some neural units on others, is controlled by the functioning of
distinct control units (Daw et al., 2005; Stephan et al., 2008; den
Ouden et al., 2010). These are called ‘neural control structures’
by Clark (1998) (For assessments of the empirical evidence, see:
Kok et al., 2012, 2013; Friston et al., 2015a). Attention-modulated
‘gating’ is the central mechanism that allows for the formation of
transient task- and context-dependent coalitions or ensembles of
neural units and networks (Sporns, 2010; Park and Friston, 2013;
Anderson, 2014).
Thus, in the predictive processing framework, attention is the
main driver of action-perception. Clark (2016, p. 148ff) describes
possible implementations of this scheme in the brain. Much
like for first-order expectations, the system encodes expectations
about precision in the generative model, presumably in the
higher levels of the cortical hierarchy (Friston et al., 2014). These
signals, which carry context-sensitive second-order statistical
information, then guide the balancing act between top–down
prediction signals from the generative models and bottom–up
error signals in attention (see Figure 6).
It has been argued that predictive processing models
offer a plausible implementation for the neural-computational
realization of affordance-responsiveness in the nervous system
(Clark, 2016). As we shall see below, the free-energy model
provides a mechanistic implementation of the dynamical
gradient generation and consumption conception of affordance
engagement examined above (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014).
Free-energy is minimized through action and perception
by the predictive processing hierarchy, which provides a




We lack comprehensive accounts of how the conventions
that give rise to sociocultural affordances are successfully
internalized, both as implicit knowing how and explicit knowing
that. As Searle and others (Sterelny, 2007; Tuomela, 2007;
Tomasello, 2014; but see Zahavi and Satne, 2015) have shown,
and as our models suggests, it takes higher-order levels of
intentionality, meta-communication, and perspective-taking in
order for symbolic conventions to be used and manipulated—
and for more complicated, self-referential thinking (“I know that
she thinks that I believe that she intends to X,” etc.), collective
intentionality, and multiple orders of mindreading.
FIGURE 6 | A diagram of the looping effects that mediate cultural affordance learning. Regimes of attention, a central kind of patterned cultural practice,
and higher level expectations encoded in higher levels of the cortical hierarchy, guide agents’ attentional styles. In the free-energy framework, attention is modeled as
precision-weighting and has the function of controlling activation across the various levels of the cortical hierarchy by tuning the gain on error units (that is, they
realize the function of gating effective connectivity in the brain). In turn, differences in how attention is deployed (through gating) lead to varying salience landscapes
and to different expectations being encoded in the predictive hierarchy. Based in part on Figure 1 in Friston et al. (2014).
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The question for the present essay is how this framework
can be scaled up to account for cultural and social cognition
and learning. The everyday phenomenology of affordances is one
of possibilities for action and their variations; in other words,
of expecting certain nested action possibilities and prescriptions
for action. In effect, the phenomenology of affordances is a
phenomenology of expectations about available and appropriate
agent-environment couplings. The neural-computational models
derived from the free-energy principle traffics in predictions and
conditional probability distributions (called ‘beliefs’ in Bayesian
probability theory, without any claim to correspond to the folk
psychological notion). Arguably, the phenomenological correlate
of these Bayesian beliefs can, at least at some (presumably higher)
levels of the predictive hierarchy, be thought of as (or at least
codetermine) agent-level expectations. Our remarks below focus
on clarifying how the social scaffolding of agents leads to their
acquisition of representational content in regimes of shared
attention.
Skilled Intentionality and Affordance
Competition
On the radical embodied view, the central feature of the dynamic
relations between organisms and environment is the tendency
of the organism to move toward an ‘optimal grip’ on the
situation. The optima in question, as nearly everywhere in
biology, are local optima, rather than a single global optimum.
Under the free-energy framework, the ‘optimal grip’ can be
understood as the pattern of action-perception that most
minimizes variational free-energy. The free-energy minimizing
dynamics of the predictive hierarchy might be described as
a kind of weighted or biased competition between different
affordances, the ‘affordance competition’ hypothesis (Cisek, 2007;
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016). This model
of action selection theorizes that the cognitive system appraises
different trajectories for motor action simultaneously during
action selection (that is, appraising a whole field of affordances in
parallel and dynamically settling on the most salient affordance).
Sport science provides an illustration of this tendency toward
optimal grip (Hristovski et al., 2006, 2009; Chow et al., 2011).
Studies of the dynamic interplay between a boxer’s stance and
position, and the action possibilities available to them as a
function of stance and position, have shown that punching bags
afford different kinds of strikes to boxers as a function of the
distance between boxer and punching bag. Boxers tend to move
their bodies to an optimal distance from the punching bag,
specifically, one that affords the greatest variety of strikes. This is a
case of moving toward optimal grip. When observing a painting,
we also move our bodies and our gazes in a way that maximizes
our grip on the scene or details observed. We might call such
dynamic adaptive engagement with field of affordances in rolling
cycles of action-perception ‘skilled intentionality’ (following
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012; Rietveld, 2008b, 2012; Bruineberg
and Rietveld, 2014).
Using the theoretical frameworks of dynamical systems
and self-organization, Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) have
conceptualized this skilled intentionality as a kind of coping
with the potentials that well up in the field of affordances, as
a result of the dynamic relations between organism (with its
phenotypical states, its states of action readiness, its concerns,
etc.) and environment. More specifically, they suggest that skilled
intentionality is the generation and reduction (or ‘consumption’)
by the organism of a ‘gradient’ or potential tension in the
field of affordances (which can be modeled using attractor
dynamics). We sketched this approach in Sections “Landscapes
and Fields” and “Meaning and Affordances,” without the free-
energy framework. The full significance of dissipative dynamics
in the field of affordances can now be appreciated.
Affordances that are relevant to the organism at a given
time (solicitations) drive system dynamics by soliciting rolling
loops of action-perception and are prescribed and consumed
or dissipated by those very dynamics (Tschacher and Haken,
2007). That is, solicitations are equivalent to potentials in the
field of affordances, which act as attractors on the organism-
environment dynamics, changing those affordances to which
the organism is selectively open and receptive. The solicitations
with which the organism engages, on this view, is the one
that most effectively minimizes free-energy. Affect, attention,
and affordances interact to sculpt a field of solicitations out
of the total landscape of available affordances, adaptively and
dynamically moving the organism toward an optimal grip on
situations through action-perception. As the organism moves
along a gradient toward an optimal grip, the gradient dissipates.
The field of affordances thus changes dynamically along with
perception-action and changes to states of the organism and
environment. Responsiveness to the field, informed by states
of the organism and environment, prescribe modes of optimal
coupling. The radical embodied conception of cognition as
skilled intentionality, then, can be modeled using systems
theoretical models as a kind of selective responsiveness to salient
available affordances or solicitations, modulated by states of
the organism (concerns, interests, abilities) and states of the
environment. This framework effectively bridges the descriptive
levels of phenomenology, system dynamics, and cognitive
functions or mechanisms.
To date, most work on affordances has focused on motor
control and basic behaviors related to dynamical embodied
coping (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo
and Cisek, 2016). For a theory of cultural affordances, the
notion of affordances must be extended to more complex
features of the social and cultural niche inhabited by humans
(Heft, 2001; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014). Quintessential human abilities like language,
shared intentionality, and mind-reading/perspective-taking
emerge from human forms of life and are patterned by human
sociocultural practices (Roepstorff et al., 2010), which in turn
involve sophisticated forms of social cognition. We live in a
landscape of cultural affordances.
Shared Expectations, Local Ontologies,
and Cultural Affordances
The upshot of our discussion so far is a general concept of
skilled intentionality as selective engagement with a field of
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affordances supported by embodied generative models. Skilled
intentionality is a graded phenomenon. At one extreme, skilled
intentionality consists in contentless direct coping. It has been
suggested that this most basic form of intentionality, which
Hutto and Satne (2015) call ‘ur-intentionality,’ acquires its
tendencies for selective targeted engagement with the world in
a ‘teleosemiotic’ process shaped by evolutionary history6. At
this extreme, the only information (and affordances) needed
are of the natural kind (exploitable reliable correlation). At the
other extreme, we find stereotypical human intentionality, that
is, symbolically dense and strongly content-involving forms of
collectively and conventionally rooted intentionality (Kiverstein
and Rietveld, 2015), which involves conventional information
and affordances. This is a spectrum, and all points between
these extremes are viable (at least prima facie). The teleological
basis of this variation might be the needs, concerns, and abilities
relevant to a given form of life, (Bruineberg and Rietveld,
2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), in specific social niches
with their own idiosyncratic shared representations, symbols,
etc.
Our claim here is that cultural affordances (especially
conventional ones) form a coordinated affordance landscape,
which is enabled by sets of embodied expectations that are
shared by a given community or culture. Social niches and
cultural practices generally involve not isolated, individual
affordances or expectations but local landscapes that give
rise to and depend on shared expectations. We submit
that these shared expectations—implemented in the predictive
hierarchies, embodied in material culture, and enacted in
patterned practices—contribute to the constitution of the
landscape of affordances that characterizes a given community
or culture. Indeed, shared expectations modulate the specific
kinds of intentionality that are effective in a given community,
determining the forms taken by skilled intentionality, especially
the shared skilled intentionality of the kind that constitutes a
patterned sociocultural practice.
Patterned practices are specific ways of doing joint activities
in domain-specific material-discursive environments (Roepstorff
et al., 2010). Echoing recent work on the natural origin of
semantic content (Hutto and Satne, 2015; Sterelny, 2015),
we hypothesize that such ontologies, as socially shared and
embodied expectations, come to be acquired by the individual
agent through their participative immersion in specific patterned
practices available in multi-agent, symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of social life.
Building on work in cognitive science as well as by Hacking
(1995, 1999, 2002, 2004), Kirmayer and colleagues have argued
for an embodied, enactivist approach to the study of the
multilevel feedback or ‘looping’ effects involved in jointly-
mediated narratives, metaphors, forms of embodiment, and
mechanisms of attention (Kirmayer, 2008, 2015; Seligman and
6‘Teleosemiotics’ is teleosemantics minus the semantics, that is, using the
teleosemantic framework developed by Millikan (1984, 2004, 2005) to explain
how organisms develop selective intentional response tendencies without trying
to provide thereby an account of semantic content (Hutto and Myin, 2013). See
also Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015) for a complementary account of minimal
intentionality as a contentless form of skilled intentionality.
Kirmayer, 2008; Kirmayer and Bhugra, 2009; Kirmayer and Gold,
2012). In human life, the regularities to which agents are sensitive
are densely mediated (and often constituted) by cultural symbols,
narratives, and metaphors, which may explicitly reference or
tacitly assume particular ontologies. These mechanisms shape
social experience and in turn are shaped by broader social
contexts.
Elsewhere, we have suggested that local, culturally specific
ontologies can be understood as sets of shared expectations
(Kirmayer and Ramstead, 2016). A ‘local ontology’ can be
defined as a mode of collective expectation: agents expect
the sociocultural world to be disclosed in certain ways rather
than others and to afford certain forms of action-perception
and nested variations to the exclusion of others. A local
ontology, then, is a set of expectations that are shared by
members of a cultural community. We claim that these sets of
shared expectations are installed in agents through patterned
practices that result in enculturation and enskillment. In the
framework explored above, these ontologies codetermine the
exact affordances that are available in a given niche, for they
prescribe specific ways of being, thinking, perceiving, and acting
in context that are situationally appropriate.
These local ontologies need not be explicitly formulated as
metaphysical theories. They are more often implicit and acquired
through participation in patterned practices and the enactment
of customs and rituals, or embodied in the social material
reality itself (as symbols, places, stories). Such distinctively
human practices take place in social niches rich with narratives,
symbols, and customs, which enable individuals to respond
cooperatively and, at times, to infer other agents’ states of
mind. Such practices may underlie everyday processes of person-
perception. For example, as noted in the introduction, by
age 5, children have acquired local ontologies and categories
of personhood—which reproduce the dominant set of biases,
expectations, and representations of their cultures—showing
preference for dominant group culture often without being
explicitly taught to do so, and despite their caregivers not
consciously holding such views, even when these biases are not
consonant with their minority identities (Clark and Clark, 1939;
Kinzler and Spelke, 2011). These tacit views of others may arise
both from the ways in which local niches are structured by
social norms and conventions and from regimes of attention
and interpersonal interactions shaped by cultural practices
(Richeson and Sommers, 2016). Biases in person-perception will,
in turn, influence subsequent social interaction and cooperative
niche construction in a cognitive-social loop (Sacheli et al.,
2015).
As discussed above, a number of theorists of embodied
cognition have criticized the view that intersubjective interactions
require that human beings be endowed with the capacity for
mind-reading, opting instead for an explanation in terms of
embodied practices and coupling (Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Fuchs
and De Jaegher, 2009). Although we readily grant the importance
of such embodied coping for basic minds on which more
elaborate cognition can be scaffolded, we advocate a middle
ground that posits both embodied contentless abilities and more
contentful mindreading abilities (Michael et al., 2014; Tomasello,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 July 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1090
fpsyg-07-01090 July 26, 2016 Time: 13:17 # 15
Ramstead et al. Cultural Affordances
2014; Sterelny, 2015; Veissière, in review). Indeed, the framework
we have proposed, which posits predictive processing hierarchies
apt to engage with both natural and conventional information
and affordances, can accommodate both modes of cognition.
The view that human societies rely on explicit and implicit
forms of mindreading does not commit us to intellectualism
or to a strong content-involving view. The shared enactment
of meaning, involving expectations about other agents, comes
to constitute the shared, taken-for-granted meaning of local
worlds, which in turn feeds back, in a kind of looping effect, to
developmentally ground and scaffold the enactments of meaning
by individual agents, by altering the shared expectations that are
embodied and enacted in the social niche (Kirmayer, 2015). These
shared ontologies shape experience by changing the abilities and
styles of action-perception of encultured agents.
Shared Expectations and Implicit
Learning
We have already appealed to Grice’s theory of meaning to
clarify some aspects of affordances. Affordances come in a
spectrum, ranging from those that depend only on reliable
correlation to those that depend on shared sets of expectations.
Grice’s account, as improved by others (Sperber and Wilson,
1986; Levinson, 2000; Tomasello, 2014), can help account for
how we successfully learn to detect and selectively respond
to context in situations that involve higher order contextual
appraisal, including perspective-taking and reading of other’s
goal-directed intent and actions. In higher-order, rule-governed
semiotic contexts, the actual presence of others is not necessary
for inferences to be made about the ‘correctness’ of affordances in
terms of their correspondence to others’ expectations, norms or
conventions. The general internalized idea of how others would
interpret a situation and context (or how a culturally competent
actor would respond) suffices for ‘meaning’ to be derived or
inferred.
Most of us have never been explicitly taught precisely how
to behave, sit, move, speak, take turns, and interact with
others in shared spaces such as metros, elevators, hallways,
airplanes, university classrooms, bars, dance floors, janitors’
closets, or the many other spaces we know not to enter.
As mentioned in the introduction to this essay, children
acquire the dominant social norms and appropriate behavioral
repertories and responses without explicit instruction. Although
we do occasionally receive explicit instructions, these do not
seem necessary for normal social functioning; as Varela (1999)
pointed out, we have acquired the implicit ‘know how’ to
act appropriately. That is, human beings acquire characteristic,
stereotypical ways of doing and being in response to social
contexts; in a sense, each of these constitutes habitual ‘micro-
selves’ as we variously engage the world as our ‘getting-on-the-
bus-self ’ to our ‘having-lunch-self,’ etc., where each self is a style
of situationally adequate and socially appropriate coupling to
a context. How do we acquire the ability to selectively detect
and respond to such sociocultural affordances? Or to rephrase
the question in anthropological terms: how do us come to be
socialized or enculturated for participation in shared worlds of
expectations?
The highly stable conformity of behavior in all of these
contexts goes beyond direct imitation (Michael et al., 2014).
Many everyday situations involve coordinated action among
many participants. Although some forms of coordinated group
action can occur entirely through individual responses to local
impersonal affordances (e.g., the swarming of birds), in order to
read and master the social cues and scripts in complex human
settings, the actors involved need to grasp the situation from the
perspective of other actors. This perspective-taking is essential if
each actor’s appraisal of the situation is to have any counterfactual
depth with regard to explicit social norms (e.g., inferring that
one’s behaving differently would fail to conform to others’
expectations about correct behavior). However, as argued above,
in some instances this perspective-taking might not involve
explicit, content-involving processes; the expectations might
simply be encoded and leveraged for the generation of adaptive
behavior without mentalistic assumptions being made about
agents at an explicit, conscious level. Thus, in any case, for a given
space to afford the same engagements to a given population, that
community must come to share a set of collective expectations—
indeed, shared expectations about others’ expectations about our
expectations, and so forth.
REGIMES OF SHARED ATTENTION AND
SHARED INTENTIONALITY
The framework we have outlined for cultural affordances
allows us to reconsider the natural origins of content. We
hypothesize that the central mechanism whereby cultural
affordances are acquired, especially conventional, content-
involving affordances, consists in the looping or feedback
relations between shared intentionality and shared attention.
Shared intentionality is enacted in various concrete, materially
embedded cultural practices and embodied as shared sets
of expectation. Shared attention is one such form of
shared intentionality. We suggest that shared attention is
crucial because directed attention modulates the agent’s
selective engagement with the field of affordances. Given
the nature of the predictive hierarchy, to wit, to extract
explicit and implicit statistical information, directing an
agent’s attention is tantamount to determining which
expectations (Bayesian prior beliefs) will be encoded in
the hierarchy. This, in turn, leads to different sets of
abilities being implemented by the gating mechanisms of
the predictive hierarchy. Under the free-energy principle,
action-perception is guided attention (precision-weighting),
and the gating process that is realized by attention itself
rests on the expectations encoded in the generative models
embodied by the organism. These high-level expectations
about precision, which modulate allocations of attention
(and thereby determine action-perception through gating),
are leveraged to guide skillful intentional behavior. The
sets of expectations embodied and enacted by organisms
change the field of affordances. This mechanism, we
submit, is exploited by culture in the acquisition of cultural
affordances.
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Gating, Abilities, and Affordances
In the framework outlined above, we followed Rietveld and
Kiverstein (2014) in defining an affordance as a relation between
a set of features or aspects of the organism’s material environment
and the abilities available in that organism’s form of life. We are
now in a position to better define ability in terms of a gating
control pattern, that is, a sequenced or coordinated process. An
ability is simply the capability of an organism to coordinate its
action-perception loops to skillfully engage an affordance in a way
that is optimal under the free-energy principle. An ability, then,
in the free-energy framework, includes a pattern of attention,
in the specific sense employed by the free-energy framework.
We use the term ‘attention’ not in the folk-psychological sense,
as that effort or mechanism that allows us to attend to specific
aspects of experience, but as the mechanism of precision-
weighting that mediates neural gating and allows the agent
to engage with specific affordances in action-perception cycles.
Attention, in our technical sense, therefore modulates effective
connectivity and, as such, determines the trajectories taken by
the rolling cycles of action-perception. Typically, in the case
of human agents, such patterns of attention are acquired over
development.
We conjecture that we acquire our distinctively human
abilities from our dense histories of temporally coordinated
social interaction and shared cultural practices (Tomasello et al.,
2005; Roepstorff, 2013). Attentional processes are central to
this enculturation and installation of shared semantic content.
In particular, the landscape of affordances available to the
infant is sculpted, through joint-attentional practices that reflect
sociocultural norms, into a field of relevant solicitations. Thus,
participation in patterned practices allows the installation
of socially, culturally, and situationally specific expectations,
which, once acquired, determine agent allocations of attention
(the acquisition of abilities) and, as a result, guide action-
perception.
Joint (and, eventually, shared) attentional processes
(Tomasello, 2014) provide a central mechanism through
which the individual is molded to conform to specific group
expectations and participate in forms of cooperative action.
Joint and shared attention alters the field of affordances
by directing the agent to engage with specific affordances,
marking them out as relevant, and making them more
salient. Given the nature of the predictive hierarchy, that
is, to automatically extract statistical information about
the distal world in its dynamic engagement (in action-
perception), the agent will encode the regularities of the
solicitations that it engages (that is, the relevant affordances
to which it is directed in joint and shared attention).
Of course, local practices of joint and shared attention
themselves depend on agents sharing sets of expectations—
the same expectations that become encoded by agents as
they participate in these practices. Through participation in
patterned cultural practices that direct attention in specific
ways, the agent acquires sets of expectations that gave rise,
in the first instance, to (earlier versions of) that very form
of cooperative action (see Figure 6). Cultural affordances
are thus mediated by recursive regimes of shared attention,
of which joint-attention is a special, signal case (Tomasello,
2014).
The study of everyday social interactions reveals how
regimes of joint attention shape our understanding and sensory
experiences of being in our worlds. For example, Goffman,
who pioneered studies of face-to-face interaction in modern
societies, showed how the ‘anonymized,’ ‘surface character’
of life in cities is routinized through what he called ‘civic
inattention’—that is, through the many ways in which strangers
avert their gazes, avoid conversations or physical contact, and
reinforce private boundaries in the public sphere (Goffman,
1971, p. 385). We can follow Goffman’s lead to consider how
different regimes of shared and joint-attention mediate lived
experiences of meaning and being. Civic inattention, for example,
is a specific regime of attention, but it is certainly not an absence
of attention. In Goffman’s ‘Invisible City’ model, attentional
resources are mobilized to not pay attention to certain features
of the world, particularly other agents caught in a symbolically
marked game of allegiances that renders them strange or
invisible.
Looping the Loop: Regimes of Shared
Attention and Skilled Intentionality
As we have seen above, in the predictive processing scheme,
attention, understood as precision-weighting of prediction error
signals, is a central mechanism behind the dynamical trajectory
of action-perception. The expectations about precision that
guide action-perception are acquired in ontogeny and stored
as high-level priors, which have the effect of arbitrating the
balancing act between top–down prediction and bottom–up
error signals. It follows that one pathway by which cultural
affordances may be transmitted is through the manipulation of
attention. This may occur in a variety of ways including what
we might call ‘regimes of shared attention.’ In the model of
affordances outlined above, this kind of attentional modulation
involves carving a local field of affordances out of the larger
landscape of available affordances through social practices.
Local environments and their associated practices are designed
to solicit particular patterns of coordinated attention from
participants (Kirchhoff, 2015a; Clark, 2016). In effect, these
patterns act as dynamical attractors on the field of affordances,
directing action-perception in some ways rather than others
(Juarrero, 1999).
In this light, one can view social norms and conventions
as devices to reduce mutual uncertainty, that is, consonantly
with the free-energy framework, as entropy-minimizing devices
(Colombo, 2014). One must know ‘what is in the minds’ of
others (such as what one would see and how one would
interpret another’s action generally and in context) in order to
make a successful inference (both explicit, content-involving or
implicit, correlational inferences) about other agents in each
situation. Goffman (1971) was hinting similar processes with
his comments on the ‘faces’ we learn to perform when we
interact with others in different situations. We can be a mentor
in one situation and a mentee in another; a father in one
and a friend in another. In Goffman’s famous comments on
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interaction in public, he describes (using other terms), how
certain spaces afford more ‘backstage,’ ‘off-screen’ performances
than others. The privacy of the home affords such relaxed ‘off-
stageness,’ and the bedroom and bathroom even more so. All
these instances require inferential mindreading or perspective-
taking, that is, inferences about the presence or absence of other
agents and their expectations as a normative guide for how one
can behave. None of this depends specifically of whether these
inferences consist in explicit mindreading or more implicit forms
of embodied coupled enactments—both are compatible with our
framework.
Now, we might suppose that the distinctly human abilities
with which we are endowed result simply from better
evolved predictive machinery, that is, more computationally
powerful predictive hierarchies (Conway and Christiansen,
2001). However, as we argued above, in human ontogeny, it
is more likely that affordances are learned through regimes of
imitation, repetition, positive and negative conditioning, and
culturally selective forms of attention (Meltzoff and Prinz, 2002;
Whitehouse, 2002, 2004; Roepstorff and Frith, 2004; Banaji
and Gelman, 2013; Veissière, 2016). The capacity for cultural
learning may itself be a cultural innovation (Heyes, 2012).
Indeed, the feedback or looping mechanisms between cultural
practices of scaffolding individual attention (what we called
regimes of attention) are themselves determined by the local
ontologies (shared sets of expectations) and abilities (acquired
patterns of attention and gating) of agents in that community.
Repetition and reiteration of patterns of social and technological
interaction, as well as reward for ‘correct’ inferences that denote
an adequate grasp of relevance, prescription, and proscription
(e.g., when a child ‘gets’ that some X means some Y, or figures
out an ‘appropriate’ combination of meaningful elements in
any given context), come to shape attentional mechanisms in
ontogeny, and assist the child in successfully inferring a set of
rules and categories (the culturally sanctioned sets of shared
expectations).
Joint attention is usually understood as occurring in a dyad
of two people, or between agents in direct interactional spheres
of communication, gaze-following, finger-pointing, or other
verbal or non-verbal cues (Vygotsky, 1978; Tomasello, 2014).
To address more complex social situations, it is useful to revise
current sociocognitive models of joint-attention to encompass
fundamentally triadic situations in which ‘the third’ is the socially
constituted niche of affordances, supported by local ontologies
and abilities.
Shared human intentionality is sufficient to project joint
attention to larger groups in the process of forming joint goals
and inferring from joint expectations. Crucially, it commonly
takes place without any direct interaction from members, in
the many routinized, anonymous, symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of sociality, including engagement with social
institutions.
To go beyond the ‘toy models’ of dyadic joint attention
to grasp the process of culture transmission we need to
study the dynamics of ‘designer environments’ (Goldstone
et al., 2011; Salge et al., 2014). Human beings pattern their
environments in a process of recursive niche construction, which
in turn modulates the attributions of attention in individual
agents, leading them to acquire certain sets of priors rather
than others, in what Sterelny (2003) has called ‘incremental
downstream epistemic engineering.’ This incremental process
of constructing our own collective, epistemic niches, involves a
kind of bootstrapping in which symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of human communication can be modeled
as forms of re-entrant processing. Linguistically abled human
beings produce patterned, structured outputs that become
part of the material environment, and are subsequently
picked up and further processed by other agents in ways
that stabilize and elaborate a local social world (Clark,
2006, 2008). Indeed, human-constructed environments, which
shape agent expectations and guide patterns of attention,
can be viewed as another level of the generative statistical
model of the niche, which human beings leverage to guide
intelligent behavior in their sociocultural symbolically- and
linguistically laden niches (Kirchhoff, 2015a; Clark, 2016). The
prior knowledge that is leveraged in action-perception is thus
encoded in multiple level and sites: in the hierarchical neural
networks, in the organism’s phenotype (over phylogeny and
ontogeny), and in patterned sociocultural practices and designer
environments.
Thus, our suggestion is that regimes of attention, which
mediate the acquisition of cultural affordances (both natural
and conventional), are enacted through patterned practices
(especially those which modulate the allocation of attention)
and are embodied in sundry ways: in the predictive hierarchies
of individual agents in a community, as encoded sets of
expectations, and in the concrete social and cultural world, as
constructed human environments, designed to solicit certain
expectations and direct attention.
CONCLUSION
We have outlined a framework for the study of cultural
affordances in terms of neural models of predictive processing
and social practices of niche construction. This approach can
help account for the multilevel forms of affordance learning
and transmission of affordances in socially and culturally
shared regimes of joint-attention and clarify one of the central
mechanisms that can explain the natural origins of semantic
content. The concepts of affordance and skilled intentionality
in ecological, radical embodied, and enactivist cognitive science
can be supplemented with an account of the nature of
affordances in the humanly constructed sociocultural niches.
Turning to cultural niche construction, we argued in favor of
a conception of local ontologies as sets of shared expectations
acquired through the immersive engagement of the agent
in feedback looping relations between shared intentionality
(in the form of shared embodied expectations) and shared
attention (modulated by regimes of attention). We elaborated
Grice’s account of meaning by highlighting the dependence
of selective responsiveness to cultural affordances on shared
and joint intentionality, modes of conventionality and social
normativity. We ended with an account of the patterned regimes
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of attention and modes of social learning that might lead to the
acquisition and installation of such ontologies and affordances,
leading to agent enculturation and enskillment. We hope that our
proposal of a framework for the study of cultural affordances will
spur further research on multilevel, recursive, nested affordances
and the expectations on which they depend.
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